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I AM MY BROTHER'S KEEPER: A TREND TOWARDS
IMPOSING A GENERAL DUTY UPON A
BYSTANDER TO ASSIST A PERSON IN DANGER
Since the early 1900's, legal scholars have argued that an individual should have a
legal duty to save another individual from bodily harm if he can do so without inconve-
nience to himself.' This scholarly rule arose in reaction to the countless situations in our
country where victims of accidents or sudden medical problems were left unattended by
bystanders. 2 Despite the continued occurrence of such shocking incidents,3 our legal
system has not yet prescribed any general legal duty to aid a person in danger." In this
country only a moral duty to help another in distress exists.' Recently, however, it appears
that what has been recognized as merely a moral duty to help someone in a perilous
situation may become a legal duty. A trend toward imposing a general duty upon the
mere bystander to assist a person in danger has been gaining momentum. For example,
Minnesota recently passed legislation requiring a bystander to render reasonable assis-
tance during an emergency to anyone exposed to or suffering from grave physical harm . 6
Rhode Island has enacted a statute requiring any person who has witnessed a rape to
report that incident to the police.' Similarly, Massachusetts recently passed legislation
which requires any person who has witnessed a crime to report that crime to the police. 8
In California, the Fifth District Court of Appeals recently modified the common law rule
Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv, 97, 113 (1908) [hereinafter cited as Ames); Bohlen,
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, (pts. 1-2), 56 U. PA. L. REV: 217, 316, 334-35
(1908) [hereinafter cited as Bohlen, pt. 1 and Bohlen, pun
See Ames, supra note 1 at 112; see, e.g., Allen v. Hixson, 111  Ga. 460, 463-64, 36 S.E. 810, 813
(1900) (employer not liable for failure to remove hand of employee from mangle); Hurley v.
Eddingfield, 156 Ind, 416, 417, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) (doctor not liable for refusal to aid sick person,
although doctor knew that he was the only one available and that person's condition was serious).
3 In the Kew Gardens Section of New York City in 1964, 38 bystanders looked on while
Catherine Genovese was attacked and beaten to death. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4. A
year later, a seventeen year old boy was stabbed on a Brooklyn subway after coming to the rescue of
some schoolgirls. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1965, at I, col, 2. Even though the assailants had left the
subway car, eleven other passengers failed to help or notify the authorities. Id. The boy bled to death.
Id. In July 1983, a thirteen year old girl who wandered into a park area in St. Louis where other
children were playing, was raped by two youths. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1983, at 5, col. 6. In spite of the
girl's screams, several people stood by without helping. Id. An eleven year old boy who was passing by
summoned the police. Id.
See, e.g., 57 Am. JuR. 2d Negligence § 41, at 389 (1971) (duties that are dictated merely by good
morals, or by humane considerations, not within the domain of the law); see also W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56 at 338-43 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
5 As the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co. aptly noted:
Suppose A, standing close by a railroad, sees a two-year-old baby on the track and a car
approaching. He can easily rescue the child with entire safety to himself, and the
instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be
styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the
child's injury, or indictable under the statute for its death.
Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 810 (1898).
6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1983). See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
7 1983 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 268 §§ 11-37.3.1-3.3. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
6 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1985). See infra notes 188-91 and accompany-
ing text.
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that a bystander owes no duty to a person in danger. 9 In Soldano v. O'Daniels, 10 the court
held that a business establishment has a legal duty to let bystanders use its telephone in an
emergency." These legislative and judicial developments indicate that this country may at
last be close to recognizing explicitly a legal duty to help someone in a perilous situation.
In the United States, the common law rule is than an individual has no duty tb aid
someone in a dangerous situation.' 2
 As one court expressed it, "under the law, a man
need not act as a [Glood Samaritan."' 3
 The common law rule of no duty is partially based
upon the individualistic philosophy of the early common law which regarded the individ-
ual as competent to protect himself without the help of others." Courts, however, have
never been satisfied with the common law rule that no general duty to assist a person in
danger exists.' 5
 As a result, courts have developed exceptions which justify the imposition
of a legal duly to render aid.° For example, where a special relationship exists between
the person endangered and the potential rescuer, courts will find a duty to render aid."
In the absence of such a relationship, however, courts refuse to enforce what has been
perceived as a moral duty to assist someone in danger." This moral duty to help someone
in danger is the law in many European countries today. 19
 France, a country whose
economic and social system is similar to that of the United States, has a law imposing a
general duty to assist. a person in a perilous situation. 20
This note will begin by examining briefly the history of the common law rule that no
general duty to assist a person in danger exists, and the reasons why courts continue to
adhere to this rule. 2 ' Next, the note will discuss the major exception to the general rule
which courts have created to justify the imposition of a legal duty to aid. 22 The major
exception to the common law rule is found where a special relationship between the
parties creates a duty to act. The third section of the note will examine developments in
Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1983).
'° 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1983).
" Id. at 453, 190 Cal Rptr. at 317.
" See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at 340. See also infra notes 27-75 and accompanying text.
'" Davis and Shaw Furniture Co. v. Underwriter's Salvage Co. of N.Y., 96 F. Supp. 963, 966 (D.
Colo. 1951), aff'd, 198 17.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1952).
The concept of the "Good Samaritan" was developed from the biblical parable told by Jesus.
According to the parable, a Jewish man on his way from Jerusalem to Jericho was robbed and beaten
by thieves. The man was left half-dead by the side of the road. As the man lay bleeding by the side of
the road, several people, including a priest and a Levite, passed by and saw the man but refused to
help him. Then along came a man from Samaria. The Samaritan saw the wounded man, had
compassion on him, proceeded to bind up his wounds, and took the injured man to an inn so that his
wounds could he treated properly. Luke 10:30-37.
14 See Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM, L. REV. 196, 214 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as Hale].
" See Buck' v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260-61, 44 A. 809, 810 (1878).
" See infra note 78.
" See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at 340-43. See also infra notes 77-121 and accompanying text.
" See Comment, The Duty to Rescue, 28 U. Prr-r. L. REv. 60, 63-64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, The Duty to Rescue).
1° These countries include Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. See
generally Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW,
91 (J. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) [hereinafter cited as Rudzinskii.
2° See infra notes 249-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of French rescue law.
" See infra text accompanying notes 27-75.
22
 See infra text accompanying notes 77-121.
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both statutory and common law which indicate a trend toward imposing a general duty to
rescue. 23
 To show that imposing a legal duty to aid another in danger is a viable concept,
this note will discuss comparative French law on rescue. In contrast to the United States,
France has a law which imposes a general duty on its citizens to assist a person in a
perilous situation. 24 Finally, this note will suggest that given the current trend in the
United States toward imposing a duty to assist, a rule of law imposing a general duty to
rescue is not only inevitable, but also desirable and workable. 23 The final section will
propose a Model Act which state legislatures could adopt in formulating and implement-
ing a rule of law imposing a general duty to assist. persons in a dangerous situation." This
Act reflects the current trend in American law by incorporating many of the terms of the
recent legislative and judicial developments into a duty to rescue.
I. ORIGIN AND REASONS FOR RULE IMPOSING No DUTY TO AID
Courts have historically been unwilling to interfere in situations where an individual,
who did not create the danger, failed to assist another in peril regardless of whether the
potential victim was subsequently harmed as a result of this omission. 27 Very early in the
law a distinction arose between misfeasance and nonfeasance.' Misfeasance is defined as
active misconduct working a positive injury to others." Nonfeasance is a passive inaction
— failure to take positive steps to benefit others or to protect them from harm. 3° This
judicial distinction is based on the belief that by "misfeasance" an individual has created a
new risk of harm to the potential victinn. 3 ' By nonfeasance, however, an individual has left
the potential victim in the same position — he has not created a new injurious situation for
which he should be held responsible. 32
 Rather, the individual has simply failed to bestow a
benefit on the potential victim. This distinction has led to the general rule that an
individual has no duty to aid another in danger if he did not create the perilous
situation. 33
The results of this general rule have often been rather shocking. 34 For example, in
23
	infra text accompanying notes 122-248.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 249-83.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 285 -311.
" See infra text accompanying notes 312 -43; See also Appendix infra.
21 See Ames, supra note 1, at 111-13; McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE LT
1272, 1283 (1949) [hereinafter cited as McNiece & Thornton].
" See Bohlen pt. I, supra note 1, at 219- 20. Bohlen thus notes:
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental
than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active misconduct working
positive injury to others and passive in action [sic], a failure to take positive steps to
benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the
defendant.
Id. at 219.
" Id. at 220.
34 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 220-21.
33 See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56, at 340. Courts, therefore, have imposed tort liability on acts of
misfeasance rather than on those of nonfeasance. See Note, The Bad Samaritan,' Rescue Reexamined, 54
GEO. L.J. 629, 630-31 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Bad Samaritan].
" See Allen v. Hixson, 111  Ga. 460, 463-64, 36 S.E. 810, 813 (1900) (employer not liable for
failure to remove hand of employee from mangle); Ficken v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 40 Ga. App.
841, 151 S.E. 688, 689 (1930) (no legal duty to aid employee after fall); Hurley v. Eddingfielci. 156
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Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier,32
 the decedent, a trespasser, had his arm and leg cut off by the
car wheel of the defendant's freight car." The defendant's employees failed to call a
surgeon or to render him any assist ance. 37
 As a result, the decedent was left on the side of
the tracks where he bled to death. 38
 In refusing to find that the railroad employees had
any legal duty to assist, the court stated that, "[w]ith the humane side of the question,
courts are not concerned." 39 Similarly, in Osterlind v. Hill," the plaintiff's decedent rented
a boat from the defendant boat owner." Once in the lake, the boat overturned and the
decedent cried out for help for half an hour before drowning.' The defendant, who
heard the cries, did nothing to help the decedent, 43 but the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts did not find the defendant guilty of any tort or crime." The court stated
that the defendant's failure to respond to the cries for help after the boat overturned was
not an infringement on any of the deceased's legal rights. 45
 In the more recent case of
Yania v. Bigan, 46
 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a landowner has no legal duty
to prevent a visitor from drowning." In that case, the drowning victim was a business
invitee on the defendant's land." The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had enticed the
decedent to jump into water that was eight to ten feet deep and that after he had jumped,
the defendant failed to help extricate hirn.' 9
 According to the court, no cause of action
existed because the defendant was not charged with pushing his guest into the water."
The court stated that although the defendant may have had a moral duty to prevent. the
drowning, he had no legal obligation to do so."
Ind. 416, 417, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) (doctor not liable for refusal to aid sick person, although doctor
knew that he was the only one available and that person's condition was serious); Union Pacific. Ry. v.
Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 654-55, 72 P. 281, 283 (1903) (railroad not liable for failure to care for person
hit by train); Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 76, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (1928) (no liability for renting
canoe and then refusing to rescue person who capsizes the canoe); Buch v. Amory Mfg, Co., 69 N.H.
257, 260-61, 44 A. 809, 811 (1898) (no duty to prevent child-trespasser from being injured by
defendant's factory machinery); Plutner v. Silver Associates, Inc., 186 Misc. 1025, 1027, 61 N.Y.S.2d
594, 595 (1st D. Munic. Ct., N.Y. 1946) (owner of premises had no legal duty to provide medical
attention to patron who became ill). Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 160 S.W. 595, 597 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913) (railroad not liable for negligent care of boy whose foot had been injured by train, since
negligent employees were outside scope of employment in rendering aid); See also RES•ATENIENT
(SECOND), TORTS § 314 (1965) thereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Section 314 reads as follows:
"§ 314. Duty CO Act for Protection of Others. The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that
action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a
duty to take such action." Id.
35
 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903).
" Id. at 650, 72 P. at 281.
at
" Id.
39
	at 653, 72 P. at 282.
" 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928).
" Id. at 74, 160 N.E. at 301.
" Id.
" Id.
44
	at 76, 160 N.E. at 302.
45 Id.
• Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). This case is discussed in Seavey, I Am Not
My Guest's Keeper, 13 VANn. L. REV. 699 (1960) thereinafter cited as Seavey].
" Yania, 397 Pa. at 322, 155 A.2d at 346.
" Id. at 320, 155 A.2d at 345.
" Id. at 318-19, 155 A.2d at 344-45.
" Id. at 321 -22, 155 A.2d at 346.
• Id. at 322, 323, 155 A.2d at 346. For recent cases holding that bystander has no duty to warn
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In all of these cases, the courts refused to impose legal sanctions upon a bystander
where he was not responsible for creating the original perilous situation. Courts have
refused to enforce what was perceived as a purely moral obligation, reasoning that the
anticipated spiritual suffering of the bystander would be sufficient sanction. 52
Judicial reluctance to require people to help their neighbors is based upon a recogni-
tion of several underlying policies and certain perceived practical difficulties involved in
using a different rule. First among these policies is the spirit of independence and
individualism inherent in the common law. 53 The common law has traditionally regarded
the individual as competent to prOtect himself without the help of others." Moreover,
scholars have been concerned that the imposition of a general duty to aid would be a
serious restraint on individual freedom and autonomy:" Indeed, one scholar has sug-
gested that if the government can legitimately require one person to act for the benefit of
another, "it becomes impossible to tell where liberty ends and obligation begins." 56
Furthermore, courts have a conceptual problem in imposing tort liability where no
definite relationship exists between the parties." In any negligence action, a court must
determine that one party owes a legal duty to another, 58 otherwise an individual is not
liable for an act which harms another." In determining whether a legal duty does in fact
exist, courts will look primarily to the nature of the parties' relationship." Courts have
of impending danger, see Mangeris v. Gordon, 94 Nev. 400, 403, 580 P.2d 481, 483 (1978)
(defendant had no legal duty to warn decedent that third party was dangerous fugitive); Sidwell v.
McVay, 282 P.2d 756, 759 (Okla. Ct. App. 1955) (man observing his neighbor's child hammering
explosives has no duty to warn the child of the danger); Cramer v. Mengerhausen, 275 Or. 223, 227,
550 P.2d 740, 743 (1976) (owner of pickup truck had no duty to warn a mechanic working
underneath vehicle that truck was about to slip off jack); Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co. of Texas, 526 S.W.2d
604, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (although bystander could warn employee of danger of entanglement
in machinery, there was no legal duty to do so). For a case holding that rescuer need not alleviate
dangerous condition to prevent harm to an unknown potential victim, see Handihoe v. McCarthey,
114 Ga. App. 541, 542-43, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1966) (property owner has no duty to secure
swimming pool to prevent child-invitee from entering and drowning in pool).
52 See Union Pacific. Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 653, 72 P. 281, 282 (1903).
" See Hale, supra note 14, at. 214; McNiece & Thornton, supra note 27, at 1288.
" Id. See Bohlen pt. 1, supra note 1 at 221. See also Hope, Officiousness, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 29
(1929). Commenting on the spirit inherent in English jurisprudence, Professor Hope states:
Self direction or personal autonomy is a mark of the English race. The Englishman, as
opposed to one of the Latin lineage, does not so easily coalesce with the mass. He
distinctly wishes to live his own life, make his own contacts, or as he frequently says,
"muddle through," in his own way. Id.
" See Minor, The Moral Obligation as a Basis of Liability, 9 VA. L. REV. 420, 422 (1923); McNiece &
Thornton, supra nose 27, at 1288.
56 Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 199 (1973).
Sr See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at 338-43.
58 See Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 615 (5th Cir. 1976); Weirum v. RKO
General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 45-46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975); Guppy v. Bunch,
88 S.D. 22, 25, 29, 214 N.W.2d 786, 788 (1974); Maxted v. Pac. Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832,
835 (Wyo. 1974); see also RF,STATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 328B.
" See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 37 at 206.
6° As Justice Cardozo pointed out in Palsgraf a. Long Island R.R.: "The risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension .... Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation." Palsgraf v.
Long Island R. R., 248 N.V. 339, 344-45, 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (1928). Having established a sufficient
relationship between the parties, the courts then consider a second factor, whether the harm was
foreseeable. See L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 93, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1942). See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 328B.
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usually found the relationship between a victim and a mere bystander insufficient to
impose on the bystander a legal duty to act."
In addition, the common law rule of no duty reflects the bystander's understandable
hesitancy to undertake a rescue." Not only does the bystander risk injuring himself if he
does undertake a rescue, but also he may find himself involved in a lawsuit if his
well-intentioned efforts aggravate the victim's injury." At common law, once an individ-
ual undertakes to aid another, even though he is under no duty to do so, he must conform
to a standard of reasonable care to avoid liability for his actions."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the common law rule of no duty owes its
survival to the belief that imposing an alternative rule would be difficult." This belief is
based upon a variety of problems in fixing liability on potential rescuers, such as: who
among a crowd of potential rescuers should be legally obligated to assist; 66 how much risk
to himself a bystander must incur; 67
 what degree of care the bystander must exercise; 68
and whether a rescuer should be compensated for injuries he sustains as a result of his
efforts. 69
 The common law was not able to formulate a rule that would overcome these
'I See supra notes 27 -52.
62 See Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MOD. L. REV. 241, 242 (1971) thereinafter cited as
Linden].
fa Id.
64 See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 237, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). The Glanzer court
noted: "it is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby
become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 34,
§ 324; Slater v. Illinois Central R.R., 209 F. 480, 483 (M.D. Tenn. 1911); Black v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 193 Mass. 448, 451, 79 N.E. 797, 798 (1907); Smith v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 570-71, 80 A.2d 664, 665 (1951). If the rescuer is injured in his rescue attempt, he can
recover damages from the third party tortfeasor. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180,
133 N.E. 437 (1921). In Wagner, Justice Cardozo stated:
The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of
the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places
their efforts within the range of I he natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life
is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.
Id. A rescuer can also recover damages from a victim who negligently creates the risk that prompts
the rescuer's action. See Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 80-81, 16 N.W.2d.668, 671 (1944); Britt v.
Mangum, 261 N.C. 250, 255-56, 134 S.E.2d 235, 239 (1964); But see Butler v. New Jersey Coast News
Co., 109 N.J.L. 255, 257-58, 160 A. 659, 660-61 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932).
" See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5, 551 P.2d 334, 343 o.5; 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 n.5 (1976). The common-law rule is "[m]orally questionable [and] owes its survival
to 'the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any
workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people might fail to rescue ....'" Id. (quoting
PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56, at 341); see also Ames, supra note 1, at 112, McNiece & Thornton, supra
note 27, at 1289.
66 See PROSSER, SUpra note 4, § 56 at 341. Professor Weinrib, however, has offered the following
solution for the problem:
Even if there are many possible rescuers, the difficulties are no less surmountable than
are those in cases of negligence involving many tortfeasors. Though potentially more
complicated on average, the rules could be the same: the victim has a right to only one
recovery, and all tortfeasors are liable to the victim, but they are entitled to contribution
among themselves.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L. J. 247, 262 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Weinrib].
67
 Scheid, Affirmative Duty to Act in Emergency Situations - The Return of the Good Samaritan, 3 J.
MAR. j. PRAC. & PROC. 1, 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Scheid].
66 Id.
66 Id. at 4-5.
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perceived problems with establishing a legal duty to help someone in a dangerous
situation:7 °
Thus, the individualistic philosophy of the common law, the absence of a definite
relationship between the parties, the bystander's risk of liability and the difficulty in
formulating and administering a new rule are factors which have contributed to a judicial
and legislative resistance to impose a general duty on bystanders to assist someone in
danger. 7 ' Nevertheless, commentators have sharply criticized this judicial and legislative
resistance to change the common law rule that no duty exists to help someone in danger,"
contending that the rule is morally questionable" and outmoded. 74 Perhaps in response to
such criticism, recent developments in both the common law and statutory law indicate a
relaxing of the stringent judicial and legislative stance and a trend toward imposing a
general duty to rescue." An indication that the judiciary was moving in the direction of
encouraging rescue was the creation of exceptions to the common law rule of no duty. 76
11. EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMMON LAW RULE
Despite the judiciary's consistent refusal to impose on bystanders a general duty to
aid persons in danger, courts have never been completely satisfied with the common law
rule of no duty," One indication of dissatisfaction with the application of the general rule
is evidenced by the judicial development of exceptions which justify imposing a legal duty
to render aid." The major exception" to the general rule that no cause of action is
7° See id.
" See Linden, supra note 62, at 242.
" See generally, Ames, supra note 1; Bohlen, supra note 1; D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan"
Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 798 (1975) [hereinafter cited as D'Amato1; Edgar, The Bystander's Duty
and the Law of Torts - An Alternative Proposal, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 302 (1976); Linden, supra note 62;
McNiece & Thornton, supra note 27; Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 Nell. L. REV. 499
(1965); Scheid, supra note 67; Seavy, supra note 46; Weinrib,supra note 66; Note, The Bad Samaritan,
supra note 33; Note, The Duty to Aid One in Peril in Good Samaritan Laws, 15 How. L.J. 672 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Duty to Aid).
" See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 341.
" See Note, Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists & The Duty to Rescue, 1976 UTAH L.
Rev. 529, 542 (1976).
" See infra. notes 122-248 and accompanying text.
" See Linden, supra note 62, at 242.
" Even judges who have dismissed claims by victims against non-rescuers have indicated the
moral revulsion with which they regard the defendant's inaction. See Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 66
Kan. 649, 653, 72 P. 281, 282-83 (1903); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260-61, 44 A. 809,
810 (1878). For a detailed discussion of Union Pacific fly. v. Cappier, see supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
76
	e.g., Maldonado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 129 Ariz. 165, 169, 629 P.2d 1001, 1005
(1981) (defendant has a duty to assist person injured by instrumentality under defendant's control);
Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 127, 118 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1961) (persons who non-negligently
create dangerous condition on highway are under a duty to take reasonable precautions against
injury to persons using the highway); L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 95, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337
(1942) (defendant has a duty to assist person injured by instrumentality under defendant's control);
Tubbs v, Argus, 140 End. App. 695, 699-700, 225 N.E.2d 841, 843 (1967) (same)Pridgen v. Boston
Housing Auth., 364 Mass. 606, 609-10, 308 N.E.2d 467, 476 (1974) (special relationship between
parties may give rise to a legal duty); Zyika v. Leikvoll, 274 Minn. 435, 447, 144 N.W.2d 358, 367
(1966) (persons who non-negligently create dangerous condition on highway are under a legal duty
to take reasonable precautions against injury to those using the highway); Simonsen v. Thorin, 120
Neb. 684, 687, 234 N.W. 628, 629 (1931) (same); Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 N.C. 292,
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available for nonfeasance is where a special relationship exists between the parties. 8 °
Where it can be shown that a definite special relationship exists between the parties "of
such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act," 8 ' the courts
have imposed a duty to act affirmatively. 82 One example of such a relationship prompting
a duty to aid is that of an employer and his employee. 83 In Szabo v. Pennsylvania. R.R.," the
decedent employee suffered a heat stroke while working." The employer ordered two of
the employee's co-workers to take him home." The co-workers did so, but subsequently
left. the decedent in the house alone. 87 The Court of Errors and Appeals stated that
enough evidence was presented to raise a jury question of whether the employer had
exercised due care in aiding the employee. 88 The court declared that when an employee
becomes ill during the course of his work, "dictates of humanity" require that an em-
ployer provide the necessary medical assistance." Another example of a relationship
imposing a duty to act affirmatively for the protection of others is that of a common
carrier and its passengers. 8° In Yazoo, M.V. Ry. v. Byrd," a passenger, through no fault of
the railroad, fell from a train. 92 The railroad employees left him lying near the tracks for
more than three hours." The railroad was held liable for failure to fulfill its duty to
provide proper attention after an accident." The court declared that "railroads owe to
their passengers the consideration and care of common humanity.'
Courts, therefore, have imposed a legal duty on an employer to come to the aid of his
injured employee in an emergency, and of a carrier to come to the aid of its passengers.
The existence of a special relationship between the parties was crucial to the courts'
finding that there was a duty to act." In the absence of a special relationship between the
300, 20 S.E.2d 299, 305 (1942) (tortfeasors have a duty to aid those injured by their conduct);
Montgomery v. Nat'l Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S.C. 167, 176, 195 S.E. 247, 251 (1937); (persons
who non-negligently create dangerous condition on highway are under a duty to take reasonable
precautions against injury to persons using the highway).
7" Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLum. L. REV. 631, 633 (1952) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Comparative Study].
94' See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at. 340-43; RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 314A.
" See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at 339.
82 Id. at 340-43.
" Id. at 341-42; see also McNiece & Thornton, supra note 27, at 1278.
*4
 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (Ct. Err. & App., 1945).
" Id. at 332, 40 A.2d at 562.
" Id. at 334, 40 A.2d at 564.
" ld. at 335, 40 A.2d at 564.
" Id. at 334, 40 A.2d at 564.
" Id. at 333, 40 A.2d at 563. See also Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 333 U.S. 821, 823
(1948); Carey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 724, 180 N.W. 889, 891 (1921); Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry
Co., 262 Mo. 560, 599, 172 S.W. 43, 54 (1914); Rival v. Atchison, 62 N.M. 159, 163-64, 306 P.2d 648,
651 (1957).
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 314A; PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at 341; McNiece &
Thornton, supra. note 27, at 1279.
81 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906).
92 Id. at 317; 42 So. at 287.
93
 Id.
" Id. at 321, 42 So. at 288.
" Id. See also Layne v. Chicago & Alton Ry„ 175 Mo. App. 34, 41, 157 S.W. 850, 852 (1913);
Kambour v. Boston & Me. Ry., 77 N.H. 33, 50, 86 A. 624, 633 (1913); Middleton v. Whitbridge, 213
N.Y, 499, 510-11, 108 N.E. 192, 197 (1915).
" See Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 334-35, 40 A.2d 562, 563-64 (1945); Yazoo &
M.V. Ry. Co. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 321, 42 So. 286, 288 (1906).
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parties, courts refuse to impose a legal duty to assist the one in danger." It seems
somewhat anomalous, however, for a court to speak in terms of "the dictates of human-
ity"' where it can identify a special relationship, and to state that with "purely moral
obligations the law does not dear" where t he court cannot identify a special relationship.
Courts appear more likely to find a special relationship in situations in which the parties
derive an actual or potential economic benefit.'" Commentators have suggested that
courts are less reluctant to impose a duty to act affirmatively in those types of situations
because the person placed under the obligation derives some 'econoMic advantage from
the relationship. 10 ' According to these commentators, the benefit that the party under the
obligation expects to obtain justifies the requirement of a duty to act.'" Under the
"benefit principle" theory, 10" an employer has an affirmative duty to act because his
business is enhanced by the services of his employees.'" The duty to aid, therefore, is a
"price" to he paid for the benefit. Similarly, the common carrier obtains an economic
benefit from its passengers.'" This economic benefit justifies imposing a duty on the
carrier and its employees to aid a passenger.'"
Recently, courts have been expanding the concept of special relationships beyond
those situations involving the How of an economic benefit to the alleged defendant. For
example, in Farwell v. Keaton,' two friends out for a social evening became involved in a
fight with a group of six youths.'" One of the two escaped, but the other was severely
beaten.'" The friend who had escaped did not obtain any medical assistance for his friend
nor did he notify anyone of his condition.m Instead, he left his friend unconscious in a
car at his grandparents' home."' The friend who had been beaten died as a result of his
" See supra notes 27-74 and accompanying text.
w Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 333, 40 So. 562, 563 (1945).
w Such v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 810 (1897).
'°° See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 27, at 1282-87; See also Scheid, supra note 67, at 5-6.
101 See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 27, at 1282-87. See also Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative
Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 209, 227 (1905), reprinted in F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN
THE LAW OF TORTS 33 (1926).
102 McNiece & Thornton, supra note 27, at 1282-83.
'°
	 at 1282.
'°' Id. at 1286.
'" Id. at 1285.
we Id. Similarly, the activities of a sailor are of such benefit to the ship's captain that admiralty
law has long held that a ship has a duty to save its seamen who have fallen overboard. Id. at 1286. See
also Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 868 (4th Cir. 1931); Salla v. Hellman, 7 F.2d 953, 954
(S.D. Cal. 1925). Courts have also found a special relationship meriting a duty to assist between an
innkeeper and a guest, Scholl v. Belcher, 63 Or. 310, 323, 127 P. 968, 973 (1912); a jailer and a
prisoner, Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 326, 124 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1962); an invitor and an
invitee, Weinburg v. Hartman, 65 A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1949); Custer v. Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 43
A.2d 716, 717 (D.C. 1945); L.S. Ayers & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 95, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1942);
Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111  N.W. I, 2 (1907); Connelly v. Kaufman and Baer Co., 349 	 r:a
Pa. 261, 265, 37 A.2d 125, 127 (1944); a doctor and a patient, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17
Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J.
Super. 466, 489, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (1979). See also Restatement, supra note 34, at § 314A; Prosser,
supra note 4, § 56, at 340-43.
1" 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
1°' M. at 285, 240 N.W.2d at 219.
"9 I . 
"° Id.
" 1 Id.
.
•	 4.
rt
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injuries."' The decedent's father brought a wrongful death action against his son's
friend."3
 The father contended that his son would not have died if his friend had taken
him to the hospital or notified someone of his condition.'" In finding for the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that the defendant had a duty to obtain medical
assistance or at least to notify someone of his friend's condition.' The court found that
because the defendant and the decedent were companions on a social venture, a common
undertaking constituting a special relationship was involved." 6
 The court concluded that
implicit in such a relationship was the understanding that one companion would help the
other in peril,'"
These decisions indicate that courts have been diminishing the scope of the common
law rule of no duty to assist a person in peril by creating an exception based upon the
relationship between the parties.' The courts have also been expanding the list of special
relationships which will justify a departure from the common law rule of no duty. "9 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts has recognized that "special relationship" is an expanding
concept in tort law.'" According to the Restatement, the law appears to be heading
toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relationship of dependence or
mutual dependence."' In addition to the expansion of the special relationship concept,
recent legislative and judicial developments recognizing a duty to aid others regardless of
the relationship between the parties, represent a further diminishing of the scope of the
common law rule.
III. THE TREND TOWARDS IMPOSING A GENERAL DUTY TO AID
American scholars and commentators have long argued for laws imposing an
affirmative duty to rescue one in peril."' For example, in his treatise on torts, Harper
hoped for the day when some "courageous court" would abandon the customary ap-
proach and hold that "the helplessness of the plaintiff and the ability of the defendant to
aid or mitigate the injury is of sufficient significance to create a legal duty to give such
reasonable aid as the circumstances of the parties require and permit." 123 Recent devel-
112 Id.
"3 Id. at 281, 240 N.W.2d at 217-18.
1 " Id. at 285, 240 N.W.2d at 219.
"s Id. at 292, 240 N.W.2d at 222.
16 Id. at 291, 240 N.W.2d at 222.
" 7 Id.
'" See Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (recent holdings suggest
that courts eroding general rule that no duty to help another in distress exists by creating exceptions
based upon a relationship between the actors).
"9
 Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 210, 169 Cal. Rptr, 282, 285 (1980) (citing Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Mann v. State of
California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977)). Parent-child relationship is also consid-
ered a special relationship. See, e.g., Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320, 322, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430
(1966) (parents owed duty to society to guard son closely to ensure he did not indulge in his vicious
propensities).
120 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 314A, comment b; we also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, n.5, 551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 n.5 (1976); Pamela L. v.
Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 211, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282, 285 (1980); Mann v. State of California, 70
Cal. App. 3d 773, 779-80, 139 Cat. Rptr. 82, 86 (1977); PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 56; 339-40; .
12 ' RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 314A, comment b.
122 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
123 F. HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 199 (1938). See Note, The Bad Samaritan , supra note 33,
at 639.
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opments in both statutory and common law indicate that the view espoused by these
commentators is becoming generally accepted and that this country is moving towards
imposing a general duty to aid a person in distress. This trend had its origin in statutes
creating a duty to aid others in certain narrowly defined circumstances.' 24 Some states
have enacted statutes extending the duty to help others in danger to more varied
situations)" The courts, too, have been more willing to recognize a general duty to aid
others.'" These various legislative and judicial developments represent a movement
towards recognizing a general duty to aid others in peril, regardless of any special
relationship between the victim and the would-he rescuer.
A. Public Welfare Statutes
One of the first indications that the law is moving towards encouraging rescue is the
expansion of the affirmative duties one party owes another where public safety is con-
cerned. For example, many states have enacted hit-and-run statutes' 27 imposing a duty on
a driver involved in an accident to stop and render assistance to any person injured in an
accident.'" The hit-and-run statutes usually require that a driver provide reasonable
assistance, including transporting the injured party to a hospital if necessary.' 29 Courts
have interpreted hit-and-run statutes to impose a duty on either party to the accident,
regardless of fault. For example, in Brooks v. E.J. Willig Transport Co. , 150 the Supreme
Court of California upheld a jury instruction that to knowingly refuse to stop after an
accident was a breach of a civil duty independent of the driver's negligence or the victim's
contributory negligence. 131 Similarly, in Meadows v. State,' 32 the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi stated that one of the main purposes of its hit-and-run statute was, "to compel the
driver of the car involved to render humanitarian assistance to the persons injured,
whether he was guilty of negligence in the operation of his vehicle at the time of the
accident or not."'"
The effect of hit-and-run statutes, therefore, is to impose on each driver involved in
an accident the duty to render aid, even though the injured party may have been the one
who caused the accident.' 34 If the driver refuses to assist and the victim is further injured
114 See text accompanying notes infra 126-49.
' 25 See infra text accompanying notes 163-90.
120
 See infra text accompanying notes 198-247.
' 27 See CAL. VEH. Cone. § 20003 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 95 1/2, § 11-403
(Smith-Hurd 1971 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 17-C (Michie 1974 and Supp. 1983).
I' See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984). Section 20003 reads in part:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any
person . . . shall render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance,
including the carrying or the making arrangements for the carrying of such person to a
physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that
treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.
Id.
' 2' Id.
130
 40 Cal. 2d 669, 225 P.2d 802 (1953).
131 id. at 678-79, 255 P.2d at 808-09.
132 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289 (1951).
133 Id. at 563, 52 So. 2d at 291.
"4
 But see RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 322, comment a (if actor's conduct, whether tortious or
innocent, causes bodily harm to another, actor under duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
future harm).
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as a result, the driver is civilly liable for any aggravation of the injuries.'" Flit-and-run
statutes are a means of protecting the general welfare of the public because they encour-
age an individual.to render necessary aid to accident victims who might otherwise be left
unattended by the roadside.'" Professor Prosser suggests that the hit-and-run statutes are
one indication of a gradual movement towards a general rule that mere knowledge of
another person in a serious or life threatening situation which an individual can avoid
with slight inconvenience may impose a duty to aid. 137
Another example of the trend toward imposing a general duty to rescue are statutes
requiring individuals to report incidents of child abuse.' 38
 State legislatures have recog-
nized that to treat the problem of child abuse adequately, state agencies need the public's
help.' 39
 All fifty states have imposed an affirmative duty on certain individuals to report
incidents of child abuse.'" The early reporting statutes required only physicians to report
instances of child abuse."' Recognizing that other nonmedical professionals also had
regular contact with children, stales began to expand the list of mandated reporters.'"
Currently, several states require that "any person" who knows or has reasonable cause to
suspect an incident of child abuse to report that incident.'" Sanctions for violating such
' 35 See, e.g., Boyer v. Gulf C., and S.F. Ry., 306 S.W.2d 215, 220 (Tex. Civ. App. ,I 957)
(defendant found liable for failure to render aid even though jury exonerated him of all misfeasance
relating to the original accident).
i" Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 563, 52 So. 2d 289, 291 (1951). In Summers v. Dominguez,
29 Cal. App. 2d 308, 312-13, 84 P.2d 237, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938), the court stressed the existence
of two distinct causes of action and stated that the liability under section 20003 of the California
Vehicular Code "is not imposed as a penalty for the actor's original misconduct, but for a breach of a
separate duty to aid . . . ."
' 37 See PnossER, supra note 4, § 56 at 343.
' 3' See CA,.. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11174 (West 1983); Fi.3. STAT. ANN. §§ 827.01-07 (West 1976
Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN.. STAT. ch . 23, §§ 2051-2061.1 (Smith-Hurd 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 119, §§ 51A-51F (West 1983 & 1984 Supp.), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.248 (1)-(16) (Callaghan
1983); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11- 1 -40-11-16 (Supp. 1983); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-08 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1983).
I" The magnitude of the child abuse problem was not fully perceived by the public, however,
until an article describing the problem was published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association. See Comment, Civil Liability for Failure to Report Child Abuse, 1 DET. L. REV. 135, 138-39
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Civil Liability]. According to the article, proper treatment of
the child abuse problem includes the reporting of such incidents to the authorities.ld. (citing Kempe,
Silverman, Steele, Droegermueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 24 (1962)).
' 44 Id. See Freiman, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50
CEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 250 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Freiman]; Paulsen, The Legal Framework for
Child Abuse Protection, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 679, 711 (1966). Paulsen notes that in the history of the
United States, few legislative proposals have been so widely accepted in so little time as the manda-
tory reporting of incidents of child abuse. Id.
141
 See Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 CoLum. L. REV. I, 3
(1967).
142 See Freiman, supra note 140, at 256-57.
"3 States that require any person to report include Delaware, Florida, Rhode Island and Texas.
Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the
Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI-KENT L. REV. 641, 658 n.113 (1977)[hereinafter
cited as Fraser]. Typical of these statutes is the following provision from the Rhode Island Statute:
§ 40-11-3. Any person who has reasonable cause to know or suspect that any child has
been abused or neglected ... shall, . transfer such information to the department for
children and their families . . . .
.	 .	 .
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statutes vary from state to state."' Although some states have chosen to impose criminal
sanctions for failing to report, 16 others have chosen to impose only civil penalties.' 46 In
addition to the statutory penalties, a recent court decision indicates that nonreporters may
be subject to civil liability for subsequent injuries to the child, 147
Child abuse reporting statutes requiring anyone to report incidents of child abuse are
significant to the development of a rule requiring rescue because they impose an affirma-
tive duty on everyone to aid children in peril regardless of their relationship to the
child,'" Liability in this instance is imposed not for an act but for an omission.' 48 Child
abuse reporting statutes, therefore, represent another step toward a general recognition
that liability may be imposed for nonfeasance as well as misfeasance.' 5°
In addition to the enactment of statutes imposing a duty to act in the limited
situations of car accidents and child abuse, other developments in the law encourage
rescue. For example, many states have enacted Good Samaritan statutes which protect.
physician rescuers from liability.''' State legislatures enacted such statutes because of the
§ 40-11-6.1. Any person ... required by this chapter to report known or suspected child
abuse ... who knowingly fails to do so or who knowingly prevents any person acting
reasonably from doing so shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction .. .
thereof shall be subject to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or
imprisonment for more than one (1) year or both.
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-3, 40-11-6.1 (Supp. 1983).
i" See Freiman, supra note 140, at 261.
" 5
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-13 (1977) (misdemeanor); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(E)
(West 1978 & Supp. 1983-84) (misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § I7-38a(b) (West 1975 & 1983
Supp.) ($500 fine); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07 (18)(a) (West 1976 & 1983 Supp.) (misdemeanor).
"6
 See, e.g., M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4009 (West 1983-84) (civil violation).
147 See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). In this case,
child's guardian ad litem sued the child's physician in the plaintiff's name, claiming that the
defendant was liable to plaintiff under the California reporting statute Tor failure to report, and
under common-law malpractice for failure to diagnose the battered child syndrome. Id, at 405, 555
P.2d at 390-91, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 70-71. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the
complaint. Id. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held that liability for failure to report
could not be based on malpractice. Landeros v. Flood, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717-20 (Ct. App. 1975).
The Supreme Court of California vacated the lower court's judgment and held that recovery could
be had on either basis. 17 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 551 P.2d at 396, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 76. See generally,
Comment, Civil Liability, supra note 139, at 135; Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 54
Cut-KENT L. Rev. 753 (1977).
"g See, e.g., FI,A. STAT. ANN. § 827.07 (3) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983): "Any person, including, but
not limited to, any physician, nurse, teacher, social worker, or employee of' a public or private facility
serving children, who has reason to believe that a child has been subject to abuse shall report or cause
reports to be made to the department."
"9 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Ser. Law § 420 (1) (McKinney 1983) (any person, official or institution
required by title to report a case of suspected child abuse or maltreatment who willfully fails to do so
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor). At common law, no liability existed for omissions. See Atnes,supra
note 1, at 112.
l" Fraser notes that the number of reported cases of child abuse has increased on a yearly basis
since the first reporting statute was enacted in 1962. Fraser, supra note 143, at 646.
1" ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1471 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-624 (1979); Co'.. REV. STAT. §
13-21-108 (Stipp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (West.Supp. 1983); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 164 (West 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:12 (Equity 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (West
Supp. 1983-84); OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.23 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5 (West
Supp. 1983-84); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.48 (West 1983); WYO. STAT. § 33-26-143 (Michie 1977 & 1983
Supp.). A typical relevant provision reads as follows: "A physician . . . who in good faith renders
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growing concern that the threat of malpractice suits was preventing many physicians from
rendering emergency aid at the scene of an accident." 2
 Good Samaritan statutes seek to
encourage prompt treatment of accident victims by exempting physicians from civil
liability when their conduct is less than grossly negligent." Recently, several states have
extended the protection of Good Samaritan statutes to exempt all volunteers from civil
liability.' 54
 These statutes provide that individuals who render emergency care shall not be
liable in civil damages for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence." One
commentator has noted that these statutes come very close to a legal recognition of a duty
to aid by granting immunity to all persons who render emergency care."'" The effect of
these statutes, therefore, is to encourage rescue. 157
Another example of a legislative development encouraging rescue is the enactment
of statutes indemnifying individuals who are personally injured or suffer property dam-
age in aiding the prevention of a crime or in the apprehension of a criminal.' Citizens
who help prevent crime are assuming some of the responsibilities of state officials. 159 In
recognition of this service, several states indemnify citizens for any injuries or damages
they sustain in preventing crime." California has extended the coverage of its indem-
nification law. Under California law, the state will also indemnify individuals for injuries
or property damages they sustain in rescuing someone in a life threatening situation, such
as a "fire, drowning or other catastrophe."'"' The statute specifically states that the state
emergency care at the scene of an emergency ... shall not be liable for civil damages as a result of acts
or omissions . . . in rendering the emergency care, except acts or omissions amounting to gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct." Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 14.563(1) (Callaghan 1980). See
generally, Note, The Duty to Aid, supra note 72, at 672; Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and
a Proposal, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 418 (1964). See also Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN.
L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Franklin].
in Franklin, supra note 151, at 52. Physicians were aware that they had to conform to the usual
standard of care in providing emergency care. Id.; see also supra note 64. If they failed to provide
reasonable care they would be subject to liability. Franklin,supra note 151, at 52-53. Thus, physicians
lobbied the legislature to reduce the standard of care during an'emergency. Id. at 53. See generally,
Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 CoLum. L. Rev. 130! (1964).
I 43
 See Note, The Duty to Aid, supra note 72, at 676; see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
"4 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76 § 5 (West Supp. 1983-84); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.500 (1979); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (West Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (Michie 1981).
155
 Id.
' 56 See Note, A Duty to Aid, supra note 72, at 651.
"7 Id.
1" See CAL. Gov . CODE § 13970 (West 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 70, § 71 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983-84); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 258A, §§ 1-8 (West 1983 & 1984 Supp.); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
217.010-217-270 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, ch. 4B, 1-25 (West Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ch. 25, § 12-25-1-13 (Michie 1981).
' 59 See Comment, The Duty to Rescue, supra note 18, at 68.
1 " See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 13970 (West 1980).
1 " Id. Section 13970 of the California Code reads as follows:
§ 13970 DIRECT ACTION OF CITIZENS AS BENEFITING PUBLIC; INDEM-
NIFICATION IN CERTAIN CASES.
Direct action on the part of private citizens in preventing the commission of crimes
against the person or property of others, or in apprehending criminals, or rescuing a
person in immediate danger of injury or death as a result of fire, drowning, or other
catastrophe, benefits the entire public. In recognition of the public purpose served, the
state may indemnify such citizens, their surviving spouses, their surviving children, and
any persons dependent upon such citizens for their principal support in appropriate
cases for any injury, death, or damage sustained by such citizens, their surviving
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indemnifies the rescuer because of the important public purpose he has served.' 61 By
extending its coverage to situations not involving criminal activity, the California statutes
explicitly recognize the desirability of encouraging rescue in our modern society.'"
B. Recent Rescue and Reporting Statutes
In a growing number of instances, state legislatures have been actively encouraging
rescue. This is illustrated by the enactment of the Good Samaritan statutes and the
Indemnification statutes. Various state legislatures have imposed a duty to assist injured
automobile accident victims and abused children by enacting hit-and-run statutes and
child abuse reporting statutes. Recent statutory developments in some states, however, go
beyond imposing a duty in the limited situations of injured automobile accident victims
and abused children and impose liability on bystanders who do not rescue persons in a
perilous situation when they have the ability to do so. Additionally, various states impose a
duty on its citizens to report a crime they have witnessed to the police.
Vermont was the first state" to pass a law requiring an individual who sees another
in danger to give reasonable assistance. 165 Such assistance is required by law only when no
risk is involved for the rescuer.'" The Vermont statute was adopted in response to
reported incidents of persons refusing to render aid in emergency situations for fear of
legal liability.' 67 Of particular concern to the Vermont legislature was the reported
hesitancy of physicians to respond to emergency situations.'" One of the goals of the
Vermont legislature, therefore, was to enact a law which would provide physicians and
the general public with protection from civil liability.'" More importantly, the legislature
wanted to encourage rescue by imposing criminal sanctions on reluctant rescuers.' 7° The
spouses, their surviving children, and any persons dependent upon such citizens for
their principal support as a direct consequence of such meritorious action to the extent
that they are not compensated for the injury, death, or damage from any other source .
. .
Id.
L62 Id.
163 Id,
'°.4 See Franklin, supra note 151, at 55.
"I' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (Equity 1973 & 1983 Supp.). Entitled the "Duty to Aid the
Endangered Act," section 519 of title 12 of the Vermont Statute provides:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a) of
this•section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross negligence
or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration [sic]. Nothing contained in
this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the
healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more
than $100.00.
Id.
"6 Id. at § 519(a).
"I See Comment, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act: The Impact and Potential of the Vermont Approach, 7
VER. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Endangered Act]. See generally Franklin,
supra note 151, at 53-61.
1" See Comment, Endangered Act, supra note 167, at 145.
I" Id. at 156.
"" Id.
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Vermont legislature accomplished its goals by adopting the "Duty to Aid the Endangered
Act," which both provides immunity to rescuers and imposes a criminal penalty on
bystanders who refuse to come to the rescue of individuals in danger. ] °' An individual
who willfully fails to render aid is subject to a fine of not more than $100 under the
statule.'" The statute, however, does not state whether a civil action may he brought
against an individual who has failed to assist someone in danger.'
As a means of further encouraging rescue, the Vermont legislature adopted a
standard lower than the traditional standard of reasonable care.'" Under the statute, an
individual who provides "reasonable assistance" during a rescue is immune from civil
liability for any damages he causes as long as his conduct is not grossly negligen t.' 75
 Thus,
the Vermont statute seeks to encourage rescue by penalizing individuals who fail to assist
someone in danger and by granting civil immunity to rescuers whose conduct is less than
grossly negligent.'"
Minnesota recently passed a law similar to the Vermont statute imposing a fine on
bystanders who do not aid persons in a perilous situat ion .' 77 The law requires a bystander
to render reasonable assistance during an emergency to anyone who is exposed to or has
suffered from grave physical harm. ] °" Included in the statute's definition of reasonable
assistance are such acts as calling the police and obtaining medical help."e The statute
does not, however, require a bystander to act if he would risk danger to himself.'"
' 7 ' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 519 (Equity 1973 & 1983 Supp.). One commentator has pointed out
that "both characteristics are intended to promote the altruistic purposes of the statute." Comment,
Endangered Act, supra note 167, at 144.
172
 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 519(c) (Equity 1973). D'Amato states that criminal sanctions are
more appropriate than ton liability because: a) the duty to rescue is owed to society and not to the
individual; b) when society has been wronged a criminal sanction is appropriate; c) criminal sanctions
heighten the public moral sensibility while the safeguarding of prosecutorial discretion promotes
fairness; and d) tort actions are subject to abuse and are ineffective against judgment proof defen-
dants. D'Amato, supra note 72, at 806-08.
173
 See St. Johnsbury & Lamoille Co. R.R. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 341 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 n.5
(D. Vt. 1972) (section 519 does not mention civil liability). See also Franklin, supra note 151, at 57.
' 74 VT. STAT. ANN. lit. 12, § 519(6) (Equity 1973). See Frnklin, supra note 151, at 57. Franklin
states that Vermont chose a lower standard since the bill was initially designed only to lower the
standard of care. Id.
"5
 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (Equity 1973). When the Vermont Legislature was consider-
ing enacting a rescue law, it was apparently aware of the French rescue law. See Comment, En-
dangered Act, supra note 167, at 158-60. Given the similarities between the Vermont statute and the
French rescue law, the Vermont legislature may have chosen the French statute as a model in
creating its rescue law. For the exact language of each statute, see supra note 165 and infra note 269.
See Comment, Endangered Acl, supra note 167, at 144.
"7 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1983 Supp.). Section 604.05(1) of the Minnesota statute
reads as follows:
(1) DUTY TO ASSIST. Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that
another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent
that he can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, give reasonable assistance
to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to
obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. Any person who violates this
section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
March 19851	 ! AM MY BROTHER'S KEEPER	 513
Additionally, the statute exempts the rescuer from liability for civil damages resulting
from his rescue efforts.'"
The Minnesota law was passed as an amendment to the state's Good Samaritan
statute."' The sponsor of the bill pointed out that the bill was enacted as a result of the
alleged gang rape of a woman in a New Bedford, Massachusetts tavern.' In March 1983,
a woman who entered a tavern to buy a pack of cigarettes was reportedly raped by four
men in the presence of cheering patrons.' The New Bedford incident has prompted
other state legislatures to consider . making it a crime for a witness to fail to report a rape
or other felony to the police."' In May 1983, Rhode Island enacted a law making it a
misdemeanor for anyone, other than the victim, to fail to report a rape that takes place in
his or her presence."' Failure to report a rape is now punishable in Rhode Island by up to
one year in jail, a $500 fine or both."7 Similarly, Massachusetts enacted a law in December
1983 which requires any person witnessing a crime to report. that crime to the police.'
I" Id. at § 604.05(2).
182
 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (1982) amended by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1983 Supp.).
' 83 See THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,' August 22, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
'" Id. In the New Bedford case, six men were charged with aggravated rape in Massachusetts
Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Bieira, No. 12265 (Mass. filed March 16, 1983); Commonwealth
v. Silvia, No. 12266 (Mass. filed March 16, 1983); Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, No. 12267 (Mass. filed
March 16, 1983); Commonwealth v. Raposo, No. 12268 (Mass. filed March 16, 1983); Common-
wealth v. Medeiros, No. 13796 (Mass. filed March 16, 1983); Commonwealth v. Medeiros, No. 13795
(Mass. filed March 16, 1983). On March 17, 1984, a jury found four of the men guilty and two of the
men not guilty.
'" See Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen? States Move to Make Crime Bystanders Responsible, 69 A.B.A. J.
1208 (1983)lhereinafter cited as Kiesel].
184
 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.3.1-3.3 (1983). Pertinent provisions of section 11-37 read as follows:
11-37-3.1. Duty to Report Sexual Assault. — Any person, other than the victim, who
knows or has reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted first degree
sexual assault is taking place in his/her presence shall immediately notify the state police
or the police department of he city or town in which said assault or attempted assault is
taking place of said crime.
11-37-3.3. Failure to Report — Penalty — Any person who knowingly fails to report a
sexual assault or attempted sexual assault as required under section 11-37-3.1 shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not more than one (1) year or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500)
or both.
Id. at §§ 11-37-3.1 & 3.3.
187 Id. at § 11-37-3.3. The author of the Rhode island bill stated that the statutory penalties were
derived from the state's child abuse reporting statute which makes it a crime to fail to report an
incident of child abuse. Telephone interview with former Rhode Island State Senator Gloria Ken-
nedy Fleck on October 5, 1983. See supra note 143 for relevant provisions of Rhode Island's child
abuse reporting statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-3, 40-11-6.1 (Supp. 1983).
'" Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1985). The Massachusetts statute reads as
follows:
§ 40. Reports of crimes to law enforcement officials
Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, murder,
manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to the extent that
said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, report said crime to
an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable. Any person
who violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor
more than two thousand and five hundre d dollars.
Id.
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The statute makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine, for any witness to a rape,
aggravated rape, homicide or armed robbery to fail to report such an incident to the
police.'" Such reporting is required by law only when no risk is involved for the witness.'"
At the same time, Massachusetts' Good Samaritan statute was amended to exempt from
civil liability any person who provides or attempts to provide assistance for a victim of a
crime.'" Pennsylvania is considering passing legislation requiring any person witnessing a
crime to report that crime to the police.'"
The Minnesota, Rhode Island and Massachusetts statutes, therefore, follow the trend
set by the Vermont legislature. The main difference between the Rhode Island and
Massachusetts crime reporting statutes and the Vermont and the Minnesota rescue
statutes is that in Rhode Island'" and Massachusetts,'" witnesses would need only to
summon assistance by making a telephone call, whereas actual intervention is required
when necessary under the Vermont.'" and Minnesota 198
 statutes. It is too early to tell what
impact these recent rescue and reporting statutes will have in encouraging bystanders to
help persons in danger. One commentator has suggested that the Vermont statute would
he more effective in promoting rescue if, in addition to the statutory penalty, civil liability
were imposed.' 87
 According to this commentator, a statute imposing civil liability would
further encourage rescue and would at least compensate the victim for injuries resulting
because the bystander did not provide assistance.' 98
 Although the effectiveness of these
statutes has yet to be demonstrated, their existence alone signifies a recognition by some
state legislatures that imposing a general duty to aid others in trouble is desirable and
feasible.
189 Id.
'" Id.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 258A, § 9 (West Supp. 1985). The Massachusetts statute reads as
follows;
§ 9. "Good Samaritans"; liability
No person who in good faith provides or obtains or attempts to provide or obtain
assistance for a victim of a crime as defined in section one shall be liable in a civil suit for
damages as a result of his acts or omissions in providing or obtaining, or attempting to
provide or obtain said assistance unless said acts or omissions constitute willful, wanton
or reckless conduct.
Id.
1 " H.B. 1114, 1983 Pa. Laws (1983). See Kiesel, supra note 185, at 1209. Unfortunately, House
Bill 1114 never came out of the Judiciary Committee. The bill died at the end of the session,
November 30, 1984.
' 93 See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ II-37.3.1-3.3 (1983), supra note 186.
'" See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch . 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1985), supra note 188.
19' See VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (Equity 1973 & 1983 Supp.), supra note 165.
1" See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1983 Supp.), supra note 177.
"7 See Comment, Endangered Act, supra note 167, at 176-81. The commentator further asserts
that section 519 is difficult to enforce because a) prosecutorial resources are limited and prosecutors
handling a full caseload may not have the time or money to handle a section 519 prosecution; b) the
elements of a section 519 offense are not easily discernable; and c) section 519 has not been
interpreted by courts in the context of a criminal prosecution. Id. at 161 n.119, 172 & n.178.
Similarly, Franklin states that while the Vermont statutory scheme is criminal in nature, civil liability
for statutory violations may be desirable because a) the criminal penalties need reinforcement, b) civil
liability is no less appropriate here than in cases of negligence or violations of other statutory duties,
and c) a criminal statute puts the public on notice of proper social behavior and thus later high civil
awards are not unexpected. Franklin, supra note 151, at 56-57.
ws Comment, Endangered Act, supra note 167, at 176-81.
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C. Judicial Developments in Rescue Law
Courts, like the legislatures, have recognized increasingly that bystanders have an
affirmative duty to act when someone is in danger. For example, in Tarasoff v. Regents of
University of Californi a,' 99 the Supreme Court of California held that psychotherapists owe
an affirmative duty of reasonable care to third parties who are threatened by patients
under the psychotherapist's treatment.'m In Tarasoff, a psychologist at a university hospi-
tal was informed by one of his patients that he intended to kill a certain young woman."
Although the psychologist notified campus police that the patient was dangerous and
should be committed, he failed to warn the intended victim. 202 The patient subsequently
killed the young woman. 2"3 In a suit brought by the young woman's parents against the
therapists,' the campus police, and the Regents of the University of California as their
employer, the California Supreme Court considered whether a psychologist has a duty to
warn third parties of threats made toward them by patients during therapy. 20" Although
the court acknowledged that the common law rule imposed no duty to warn individuals
endangered by such conduct,' the Tarasoff court nevertheless found that the relation-
'" 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). This case vacated the opinion in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The ruling in Tarasoff has
been criticized as a dangerous and unwarranted extension of liability. See id. at 452-64, 551 P.2d. at
354-62, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34-42 (Clark, J., dissenting); see also Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on
Psychiatrists —A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. CoLo. L. Rev. 283 (1977); Stone, The
Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. Rev. 358 (1976); Note,
Medical Malpractice, The Liability of Psychiatrists, 42 NOTRE DAME 1,Aw 693 (1973).
"' Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 430, 551 P.2d at. 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
202 id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
"Un Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
"' The therapist defendants included the psychologist who examined the patient and con-
cluded that the patient should be committed; two other psychiatrists who concurred with the
examining therapist's decision; and the chief of the department of psychiatry, who countermanded
the examining psychologist's decision and directed that no further action he taken to confine the
patient. Id. at 430 n.2, 551 P.2d at 340 n.2, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20 n.2.
1"5 Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Gal. Rptr. at 21. In addition, the California Supreme Court
had to consider whether as the therapists' employer, the University of California, could be held liable
for the therapists' failure to warn the intended victim of the patient's threats. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at
340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The court held that the plaintiff's' complaint could be amended to state ti
cause of action against the Regents for the therapists' breach of their duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect plaintiffs' decedent. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 348, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 28. The California
Supreme Court also had to consider whether the campus police had a duty to warn the intended
victim of the patient's violent intention. Id. at 444, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 29. The court
held that the campus police did not have a duty to warn because they did not have a special
relationship with either the victim or the patient. Id.
2011 Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. See Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2c1 GO, 65, 271
P.2d 23, 27 (1954); and cases cited supra note 51. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 315. Section
315 reads as follows:
Title A, Duty to Control Conduct Of Third Persons.
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty
upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a
right to protection.
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ship between a psychotherapist and his patient was of a sufficiently special nature to
impose an affirmative duty for the benefit. of third persons. 207 The court held, therefore,
that. a psychotherapist has an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to protect. the
foreseeable victim from danger even though no special relationship exists between the
therapist and the intended victim.2"
Given the nature of the relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient, the
holding in Tarasoff is a significant indication that courts are recognizing a general duty to
assist others in peril regardless of the relationship between the parties. Traditionally, the
law has afforded special protection to doctor-patient relationships because of the trust
and confidence implicit. in the relationship. 209 In Tarasoff,,however, the court was appar-
ently more concerned with public safety than with protecting the doctor-patient relat ion-
shipyio In reaching its decision, the Tarasoff court carefully weighed the competing
interests of public safety against the need for confidentiality in psychotherapy.'" The
court stated that the obligation to protect a patient's confidences must yield where the
public peril begins.'" Furthermore, the court noted: "Our current crowded and comput-
erized society compels the interdependence of its members. In this risk-infested society,
we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result. from a concealed
knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal." 213
The Tarasoff court held that the psychotherapist's duty to a potential victim out-
weighed his duty to keep his dangerous patient's confidences. 2" In Tarasoff, no special
relationship existed between the psychotherapist and the intended victim.' This deci-
sion, therefore, is an example of judicial recognition of the principle that one can owe a
duty to rescue to another regardless of the relationship between the rescuer and the
person in danger.
The principle of Tarasoff was further extended under California law in Soldano v.
ODaniels.'" A California Court of Appeals held in Soldano that a public establishment had
a legal duty to let a Good Samaritan use its telephone in an ethergency." 7 In Soldano, a bar
patron rushed into a nearby restaurant and informed an employee that a man had been
threatened in the bar." The patron asked the restaurant employee either to call the
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24. The court
emphasized that the psychotherapist's position of trust and authority, his potential power to initiate
commitment proceedings and his special knowledge of his patient were sufficient to establish the
special relationship required to impose a duty for the benefit of the third person. M. at 436 n.6, 551
P.2t1 at 343 n.6, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.6.
2" Id. at 436, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24. According to the Tarasoff court, whether this
duty takes the form of a duty to warn, a duty to call the police or some other form will depend on the
circumstances. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
209 See e.g., Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708-09, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (1973); Anker v.
Brochnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 198, 152-53, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791,
208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566-67 (1960); Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super, 79, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962);
Schaff v. ,Spicer,-214 N.W.2d 134, 136 (S.D. 1974).
210 See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439-42, 551 1'.2d at 345-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.28,
On Id.
212 Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
213 Id.
14 Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
2 ' Id. at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at. 23-24.
110
 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1983).
217 Id. at 453, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
"B Id. at 446, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
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police or to allow him to do so. 219 The employee refused, and subsequently the man being
threatened was shot. 2" A wrongful death action against the owner of the restaurant was
brought by the decedent's son. 22 '
The issue before the Soldano court was whether the restaurant or any of its employees
had a legal duty to assist the Good Samaritan. 222 In Soldano, the defendant restaurant
argued that the request that its employees either call the police or allow the third party the
use of its telephone required affirmative action on its part. 223 The defendant relied on the
established rule that absent a special relationship, no affirmative duty exists to assist
someone in danger in contending that it was not liable for the decedent's death: 224 The
Soldano court admitted that no special relationship existed between the restaurant and
plaintiff's decedent, 225 but stated in a unanimous opinion that the common law rule of no
duty needed to be "re-examined in light of the circumstances of the case." 229 The court
subsequently found a strict application of the general rule unsatisfactory and held that the
restaurant owed the plaintiff's decedent a duty either to call the police or permit. the Good
Samaritan to call the police.'" According to the Soldano court, the bystander's duty arose
because the harm to the victim appeared to be "abundantly foreseeable. "228 The court
noted that the bartender's alleged conduct displayed a "disregard for human life that can
be characterized as morally wrong." 229
The Soldano court based its decision on several factors. First, the court examined
several recent California statutes which recognized the importance of citizen involvement
in crime prevention and were designed to stimulate active public involvement in crime
control. 23° The court noted that the statutes demonstrate that "that attitude of extreme
individualism so typical of anglo-saxon [sic] legal thought may need limited re-
examination in light of current societal conditions," 23 ' Second, the Soldano court exam-
ined elements the Supreme Court of California had previously considered in determining
whether a duty is owed to third persons.' These elements included the foreseeability of
harm," the connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm, 234 the moral
216 Id.
"° Id. at 445-46, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
22 ' Id. at 445, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
222 Id.
123 Id. at 447, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
224 See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 56 at 338-43.
243 141 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
"6 Id.
227 Id, at 453, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
228 Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
2" Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
230 Id. at 449-50, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
431 Id. at 450, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
232 Id. at 450-51, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117-18, 443
P.2d 561, 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-104 (1968); see also Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,
59 Cal. 2d 295, 307-08, 379 P.2d 513, 520-22, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40-42 (1963); Biakanja v. Irving, 49
Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); Wright v. Arcade School District, 230 Cal. App. 2d 272,
278-80, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814-16 (1964); Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App.
2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851-52 (1963).
Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The court found that the harm to the
defendant was abundantly forseeable: it was imminent since the employee was expressly told that a
man had been threatened. Id.
'34 Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rpm. at 315-16. The court further found that the employee's conduct and
the injury were connected. Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The Good Samaritan wanted to use the
518	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 26:497
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, 235
 the policy of preventing future harm, 236 the
extent of the burden to the defendant 237 and the consequence to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care. 235 In light of such factors, the court found that the
defendant was under a duty to let the bystander use the telephone. 239 Third, the court
found that the facts of the case came very nearly within the provisions of Section 327 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts."' That section states that liability may be imposed
when a person interferes with another's efforts to render assistance."' According to the
court, the restaurant employee interfered with the Good Samaritan's efforts to obtain
help by not allowing him to call the police.'" The Soldano court thus concluded that,
under the facts of this case, the restaurant owed a duty to the plaintiff's decedent. 243
The Soldano decision is a further indication that courts are recognizing that bystand-
ers have an affirmative duty to assist someone in danger. In Soldano, the court looked
beyond the special relationship concept in determining whether a duty to assist existed."'
In this respect, the court departed from the customary approach taken by courts in
determining whether a duty to assist is owed."' The Soldano decision imposes a duty on
business establishments to let bystanders use business telephones in an emergency. 24 6
Although this decision does not represent a "global change" 247
 in the common law rule
that bystanders have no duty to assist, it does at least modify the rule. The Soldano decision
is thus further evidence of a movement by courts and legislatures towards establishing a
general rule that mere knowledge of another person in a serious or life threatening
situation may generate a duty to assist.'"
phone to call the police. Id. at 451, 190 Cal: Rptr. at 315-16. The bartender's refusal prevented the
police from helping. Id. at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
335 Id. The court found that the employee's conduct displayed a disregard that could be
characterized as morally wrong; he was callously indifferent to the possibility that the victim would
die as a result of his refusal to allow a Good Samaritan to use the telephone. Id.
238 !d. The court emphasized that finding a duty in these circumstances would promote a policy
of preventing future harm. Id.
"7 Id. The court found that the burden to the defendant was minimal and exposed him to no
risk. Id.
333 Id. at. 451-52, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316. The court concluded that imposing a duty on business
establishments would not "overburden the courts." Id. at 452, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
235 Id. at 453, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
24° Id. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 327.
241 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 327.
242
	
141 Cal. App. 3d at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
243 Id. at 453, 190 Cal, Rptr. at 317.
244 Id. at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
2" See supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
246 141 Cal. App. 3d at 452, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 316-17.
247 Id. at 455, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 318. Although theSoldano court held that business establishments
have a duty to let good samaritans use the business telephone when informed of an emergency, the
court's ruling is very limited. Id. at 452, 190 Cal. Rptr, at 316. The court thus stated that "a citizen
would not be required to summon the police." Id. The court should have gone further, however, and
imposed a duty on business establishments to call the police when informed of an emergency. Such a
holding would not have been burdensome on the defendant and would have resulted in a benefit to
society.
248 See O'H ara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977). In
O'Hara, the appellate court imposed liability upon a landlord for failing to warn or take other
precautions on behalf of his tenants to avert the possibility of another rape occurring in the rented
premises. Id. at 803-04, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91. The court held the landlord liable for failure to
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IV. FRENCH RESCUE LAW
In contrast to the law of the United States, most European countries currently impose
on their citizens a duty to rescue. 249 Although the European statutes imposing such a duty
vary in scope, they all require that individuals assist a person in a perilous situation. 25°
This section of the note will focus specifically on French rescue law because of the many
similarities between the French and the American experience in the area. First, prior to
1941, the French judicial position regarding the legal imposition of a legal duty to aid was
similar to the law in this country — no legal duty existed to render aid. 25 ' Second, the
French legislative developments that eventually led to a law requiring rescue were similar
to developments in the United States discussed earlier. 252 The forty-year history of the
French statute requiring rescue illustrates that a general duty to rescue does not entail
the difficulties thought to be prohibitive in creating a duty to aid in this country. 254 The
French experience demonstrates that a rule imposing a general duty to assist someone in
danger is possible in the United States.
Enforcing a duty to rescue was a radical change in French law. 255 Before 1941, France
warn based upon his superior knowledge as the defendant alone knew of past assaults and conditions
making future assaults likely to occur. Id. at 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Although the alleged willow
act was an omission, the court did not feel obligated to determine explicitly that a special relationship
existed or that the affirmative duty to warn was based upon the landlord's control of the common
area, Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The court, instead, imposed liability because the landlord was
in a position of superior knowledge and failed either to provide added security or warn the tenant of
the danger. Id. at 803-04, 142 Cal. Rptr at 490-91. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has held that a land owner has a legal duty to rescue a trespasser in a perilous situation.
Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 364 Mass 696, 308 N.E.2d 467 (1974). The Pridgen court
noted:
The rule which we have stated is in part a recognition by the law of the ever changing
concepts of each individual's rights and duties in relation to all other members of our
society, and it reflects current standards of concern for the personal safety and well
being of each individual.
Id. at 711, 308 N.E.2d at 477. See also Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert . denied , 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 546-48, 489
P.2d 308, 313-14 (1971).
2" See supra note 19 for a list of the European countries imposing a duty to rescue. Some of
these countries have accepted such a duly as a "matter of course." See Rudzinski, supra note 19, at
122. For a discussion on Soviet and French rescue law, see Note,A Comparative Study , supra note 79, at
635-41.
2" See Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 92.
"I See Note, A Comparative Study, supra note 79, at 639.
2" For example, the 1941 Vichy statute required citizens to inform the authorities on would-be
criminals. See text accompanying notes 260-61 for a discussion of the Vichy statute. Similarly, the
Rhode Island and Massachusetts statutes and the pending bill before the Pennsylvania legislature
• require citizens to report a rape or felony they have witnessed. See supra notes 186-92 and accom-
panying text. Additionally, the Vichy legislation imposed a duty to help persons in peril. See infra
notes 260-61. Similarly, the Vermont and Minnesota statutes impose a duty to help persons in a
perilous situation. See supra notes 165 and , 177. Given these similarities, perhaps this country is
moving closer to recognizing a legal duty to help someone in danger.
253 Art. 63, CODE PENAL [C. pEN.] 59th ed., Petits Code Dallog, Paris 1962 p. 40. See Note, A
Comparative Study, supra note 79, at 640 n.66.
See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
2"5 Recent Cases, French Statute Imposing Criminal Liability for Voluntary Failure to Assist Persons in
Peril Applied to Physicians, 63 HARV. L. REV. 866, 887 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Recent Cases, French
Statute Imposing Criminal Liability]:
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did not recognize that an individual had a legal duty to rescue someone in peril.Zw An
omission did not give rise to civil liability unless the omission constituted the breach of a
contractual duty. 257 Under French tort law, one of the first exceptions to the rule of no
duty was created imposing a duty to rescue on certain individuals such as landowners and
manufacturers. 25" This exception is analogous to the exception developed under Amer-
ican tort law where a duty to assist has been imposed on the defendant when the relation
between the parties is of some economic advantage to the defendant. 250
In 1941, the Vichy government enacted a statute providing punishment of citizens
who failed to inform on would-be criminals and citizens who failed to assist someone in
periI. 260
 The statute imposed a duty to inform or assist, however, only if to do so did not
involve a serious risk to the rescuer or any third party. 26 ' The French Government
declared this statute void in I945, 262 but later enacted Article 63 of the Penal Code which
is very similar to the 1941 legislation. 213 Article 63 imposes a duty to render aid on those
persons who know that another is in serious danger.264 If an individual cannot personally
perform the rescue, the statute requires that he obtain help. 265 As under the 1941 statute,
a rescue is required only where no risk is involved for either the rescuer or other
persons. 2" Furthermore, the statute only applies where the potential rescuer is aware that
a person is in danger and that the aid is urgently needed. 267 Finally, no violation of the
statute occurs unless the failure to rescue is voluntary and intentional. 268 In determining
whether a breach of the statutory duty to aid occurred, French courts have considered
whether the potential rescuer's behavior was reasonable and necessary under the particu-
lar circturisiances. 2" individuals who are found to have voluntarily refrained from rescu-
ing someone in danger may face criminal sanctions — a jail sentence as well as a fine. 27° In
2" See Note, A Comparative Study, supra note 79, at 639.
257
2" See id.
2" See .supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
'6° Note, A Comparative Study, supra note 79 at 639-40. The Vichy Government was the name
given to the French government during the German occupation of France from 1940 to 1944.
761 Id. According to Rudzinski, this early statute was enacted to quell the activities of the
anti-Nazi underground. See Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 94.
262 See Tune, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, 43, 46
U. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) [hereinafter cited as Tunc].
210
2" Art. 63, C. PEN. 59 ed., Petits Code Datlog, Paris 1962 p. 40, reprinted in Rudzinski,supra note
19, at 130-31. Article 63 states in relevant part:
Whoever abstains voluntarily from giving such aid to a person in peril that he would
have been able to give him without risk to himself or to third persons by his personal
action or by calling help ... shall be punished by imprisonment of a month to three
years and/or a fine.
Id,
2" See Tune, supra note 262, at 48; Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 107. France extends the duty to
rescue to'every person, even persons not present, who have reason to know that a person is in serious
danger. Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 102.
266
 Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 106.
267 Id. See also Tunc, supra note 262, at 47.
"a See Tunc, supra note '262, at 48.
ZOO Id. at 50.
270 See Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 110.
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addition to the criminal penalties, violation of Article 63 gives rise to civil liability. 2"
French courts will impose civil liability whenever they determine that a reasonable man
under similar circumstances would have helped the person in danger.'" The injured
party's claim is usually handled as part of the criminal proceedings against the individual
who failed to rescue. 213 Thus, the consolidation of the criminal and civil actions saves time
and money for the court and the parties involved.
In France, if an individual in his efforts to rescue the victim further injures him,
French courts will compare the rescuer's behavior with the behavior of an ordinary
person under similar circumstances to determine liability.' In determining whether the
rescuer is responsible for any damages caused by his actions, French courts will also
consider the emergency conditions under which the rescuer acted. 278 If the rescuer is the
one who is injured, French courts will indemnify him for any expenses or injuries he
incurred as a result of the rescue:27" Possible sources of indemnification under French law
include the individual who was rescued,277 and the individual who caused the negligent
situation prompting the rescue. 278
In France, the judiciary has resolved various problems thought to be inherent in
imposing a general duty to aid. For example, problems in fixing liability on potential
rescuers, such as who among a crowd of potential rescuers should be legally obligated to
assist,278 and how much risk to himself a bystander must incur, 280 have been considered by
French courts. In cases where more than one bystander witnessed an accident, French
courts have held that each bystander was under a legal duty to assist the individual in
peril:28 ' French courts have held that assistance is required by law only when no risk is
involved for the rescuer.'" Judicial resolution of these issues in France illustrate that a
working rule for rescue situations is possible.
One French commentator has noted that Article 63 of the French Penal Code has
served "as an incentive to everybody to behave like the good samaritan." 283 The French
experience demonstrates that the imposition of a general duly to aid could be accom-
2" Id. at 113, n.61; Tunc, supra note 262, at 48 -49. Tunc states that "when the failure to rescue
constitutes a crime, it can no longer be disputed that civil liability is incurred." Id. at 49.
272 See Note, The Bad Samaritan , supra note 33, at 641. As this commentator pointed out, by using
this analysis in determining whether a bystander is civilly liable for not rendering aid to a person in
distress, French courts thus avoid having to determine the causation element. Id. Similarly, Tunc
notes: "Since causal connection is now undisputed in the application of penal law, it can no longer be
disputed in the application of civil law." Tunc, supra note 262, at 49.
272 See Rudzinski, supra note 19, at 115.
2" See Tunc, supra note 262, at 50-51.
'" id.
276
277 Id. at 52. In this situation, French courts will find an implied contract under which the
beneficiary of the person rescued must indemnify the rescuer. Id.
278
	 at 52-53.
219 Doto v. Maida, Correctional Tribunal Aix, March 27,1947, (1947] Recueil Dalloz, J. 304. For
a discussion of this case, see Recent Cases, French Statute Imposing Criminal Liability, supra note 255, at
887.
28° Judgment of March 20,1947, Cour d'Appel de Riom, [1947] Dalloz jurisprudence 304 (Fr.).
For a discussion of this case, see Note, The Bad Samaritan, supra note 33, at 635-36.
28 ' See supra note 279.
282 See supra note 280.
283 See Tunc, supra note 262, at 62. In 1962 alone, 52 persons were imprisoned and 12 were
fined under Article 63 for failure to rescue. Id. at 58.
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Plished in the United States without difficulty and could produce similarly desirable
results.
V. ARGUMENT FOR A LAW REQUIRING RESCUE
The United States appears to be moving closer toward explicitly recognizing a legal
duty to help someone in a perilous situation. 284 In a growing number of instances, the law
has imposed a duty to assist. 295 State legislatures have enacted statutes creating a duty to
assist. others. 2 "6 In addition to enacting such statutes, legislatures have explicitly recog-
nized the merits of rescue by exempting the rescuer from liability 2" and by compensating
him for any injuries and expenses he incurred as a result of the rescue. 288 Similarly, the
courts have begun to impose a more general duty to aid others, regardless of the existence
of any special relationship between the parties. 289 These developments indicate that states'
law imposing a general duty to help others in a perilous situation would be effective and
workable. Such a rule, declared by statute and enforced by the courts, would reflect the
current trend in American law by incorporating the intent of these developments into a
general duty to rescue. Concern over the personal safety and well-being of each individ-
ual in our society prompted various state legislatures to enact laws creating a duty to aid
others in specifically defined circumstances. 2" A law requiring rescue would reflect this
concern in a more authoritative and effective way. Incidents where individuals could have
helped others in danger but failed to do so"' have inspired various legislatures to prohibit
such omissions.'" Similarly, a law imposing a general duty to assist persons in a dangerous
situation would perhaps help prevent the reoccurrence of such events. The judicial
branch has recognized that our current societal conditions compel interdependence
among people.'" A law requiring rescue would reflect this awareness.
Recent developments in both case 294 and statutory law295 imposing upon a bystander a
general duty to assist persons in danger have made traditional arguments against a law
requiring rescue lose their significance. For example, critics of a legal rule requiring
rescue have argued that requiring a person to act is more of a constraint on a person's
liberty than is limiting his ability to act. 296 State legislatures, however, have been steadily
2" See text accompanying notes supra 122 -247.
995 See supra notes 127-248 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 164-87 and accompanying
text.
2" The Good Samaritan statutes enacted in many states exemplify this recognition of the merits
of rescue. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
998
 The rescuer compensation statutes enacted in some states exemplify this recognition of the
merits of rescue. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
2"9 See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal.
Rptr, 14, 20 (1976); Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App, 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 317 (1983). See
also supra notes 199-248 and accompanying text.
29° These laws include the hit-and-run statutes -and the child abuse reporting statutes. For a
discussion, see supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text.
"I See discussion on the New Bedford incident, supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
292 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. SCAT. ANN. § 604.05 (1983
West Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.3.1-3.3 (1983). See also supra notes 177-92.
293
 Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
2" See supra notes 199-248 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 127-98 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text,
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increasing the instances in which an individual is required to act. This trend is evidenced
by the enactment of the hit-and-run statutes, 237 the child abuse reporting statutes 299 and
the recent rescue and reporting statutes.'" A law requiring rescue would be but a short
extension of the legislative trend increasing the instances in which one party must
affirmatively act for the benefit of others.
Another objection to a rule requiring rescue is that such a rule would run counter to
the common law concept of individualism, 300 Recent decisions, however, point to an
increasing judicial awareness of the need for interdependence among members of our
society."' For example, in Tarasoff the California Supreme Court held that a
psychotherapist must. exercise reasonable care to protect third parties who are threatened
by patients under the psychotherapist's care."' The court made it clear that the confiden-
tial relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient must yield "where the public
peril begin S. "3" Similarly, a California Court of Appeals in Soldano stated that the individ-
ualism inherent in the common law needed to be "re-examined in light of our current
societal conditions ...." 304 A law imposing a general duty to help persons in danger would
be a logical extension of the judicial awareness that our complex society compels the need
for its members to help one another in times of distress. As one commentator suggests,
"the law exists for the realization of the reasonable needs of the community. I f the interest
of an individual runs counter to this chief object of the law, it must be sacrificed." 3° 3
Attempts to create a law requiring a general duty to rescue have succeeded. 306 Most
European countries today have a law recognizing a legal duty to come to the aid of one in
peril."' Many of these countries have had such a law since the 19th century3" and have
accepted the imposition of such a duty as a matter of course.'" France, a country which
has an economic and social system similar to that of the United States, has a law requiring
rescue. 31° France's rescue law, in effect now for over forty years, illustrates that such a law
is workable. 3" The French experience, therefore, should serve as a paradigm for the
recognition in America of a general duty to rescue.
VI. A PROPOSED MODEL ACT
Given this background, therefore, it should not prove too difficult for states to enact a
law imposing a general duty on citizens to help others in a perilous situation. To assist
2s7
	 supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
292
 See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
299
	 supra notes 165, 177, 186, and 188. •
300 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27; Soldano, 141 Cal. App. 3d
at 450, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315. See also supra notes 199 -248 and accompanying text.
3°2 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
303 Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
304
 141 Cal. App. 3d at 450, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
"3 See Ames, supra note 1, at 110.
3" Most European countries today have a law requiring rescue. See supra note 19.
"I Id.
3" These countries include Belguim, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey. See
generally, Rudzinski, supra note 19.
"2 Id.
310 See Art. 63 CODE PENAL. [C. PEN.] 59th ed., Petits Code Dallog, Paris 1962 p. 40. See also supra
note 264.
3" See supra notes 249-83 and accompanying text.
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state legislatures, this section proposes a Model Act which legislatures could adopt or use
as a point of reference in formulating and implementing such a rule of law. 312 This Act
provides that an individual who sees another in danger must give reasonable assistance. 3"
The Act reflects the current state of the law in the United States by incorporating many of
the terms of the public welfare statutes 3 " and the rescue and reporting statutes315 in effect
in many states.
The Act contains limitations which should be imposed on a rule creating a duty to
assist so that such a rule does not oppress the rescuer. 3 ' 6 For example, the Act provides
that an individual has a legal duty to assist only in cases of extreme danger to the life or
the health of another."" Under the Act, the form of assistance required would depend
upon the type of emergency involved.3's Sometimes a warning of impending danger
would suffice. Other times, as .under Rhode Island law, a call to the police or proper
authorities would he appropriate. 319 At times, personal intervention will be necessary. 32 °
No one, however, would be required to assist another when to do so would involve a
serious threat to either himself or others. 321 The rescuer's standard, as suggested in the
Act, both in recognizing the gravity of the danger involved and in assessing the form of
assistance required, should be that of the reasonably prudent person under the same or
similar circumstances."'
The Act provides that once a rescue is undertaken the standard of care required
would be lower than that of a reasonably prudent person."'" Through Good Samaritan
laws, legislatures have recognized the injustice of holding a volunteer to a high standard
of care when he renders assistance in an emergency situation."' The effect of these
statutes is to lower the standard of care that a rescuer must. observe when rendering
emergency care. These Good Samaritan statutes, therefore, relieve the volunteer from
liability for all but gross negligence."'" This priniciple is reinforced in the Act by making
the rescuer conform to a lower standard of care.
The Act also addresses situations in which more than one bystander witnesses an
312
	 Appendix infra.
313 Id.
314
	 supra notes 127-63 and accompanying text.
31s
	 supra notes 164-98 and accompanying text.
316
	 Appendix infra. "lf the encouragement of [a law requiring rescue] and the discourage-
ment of its breach would be a hardship to some ... the law should not endorse it." Honore, Laws,
Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, 225, 233 U. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Honore).
3'7 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (1) (West 1983 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (a) (equity
1973). See also supra notes 164-84.
3" See Appendix infra.
3'B
	 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.3.1-3.3 (1983). See also supra note 186.
"° See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (1) (West 1983 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. nt. 12, § 510 (a) (Equity
1973). See also supra notes 164-84.
32'
	
See Appendix infra.
322 See Appendix infra. This standard is analagous to the standard used by French courts both in
recognizing the gravity of the danger involved and in assessing the form of assistance required. See
supra note 272 and accompanying text.
323 See Appendix infra. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (h) (Equity 1973). See also supra notes
164-76. The standard of care required under the Vermont rescue legislation appears to be lower
than the traditional standard of care. Id. See supra notes 64 and 174 and accompanying text.
344
	 supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
325 Id.
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accident or criminal attack. 328 Under the Act, each bystander would be bound to assist the
individual in peril in a reasonable manner. 327 if no one helps the person in danger, each
bystander will be liable but only for the amount of injury directly resulting from his
failure to assist. 328 The victim would have a right to one recovery from all the bystanders,
who would be entitled to contribution among themselves."'
Recognition of a general duty to rescue, however, does not mean that liability will
automatically be imposed. Liability will depend upon whether a statutory duty to rescue
has been breached. Courts can determine whether a 'Jystander breached his statutory
duty to render assistance by adOpting the approach taken by the French courts. 33°
American courts should impose liability whenever they determine that a reasonable man
under similar circumstances would have helped the per on in danger. 33 ' All that the court
would have to determine is that the defendant knew of the dangerous situation threaten-
ing the plaintiff, and refused to act even though such action would not have resulted in
harm to himself or others. 332 If the court does find that the bystander did breach his
statutory duty to assist the person in danger, a fine, similar to the one provided in the
Vermont or Minnesota statute, should be imposed." As a supplement to the fine,
legislatures may want to consider creating a statutory action for civil damages as well" so
that a potential victim could bring a civil action against the individual who failed to assist
him. Civil liability encourages rescue by compensating the injured party as well as by
penalizing the wrongdoer. 335
As a means of further encouraging rescue, the proposed Act exempts the rescuer
from liability for any damages he causes to persons of property while rendering aid as
long as his conduct is less than grossly negligent. 338 The protection from civil liability
currently provided by Good Samaritan statutes is reflected in the Act.. 337 The Act extends
civil immunity to anyone who undertakes a rescue as ,ong as his conduct. is not grossly
negligent. 338 Similarly, the Act compensates a rescuer for any injuries and expenses he
328 See Appendix infra. As the Tarasoff court pointed out "Morally questionable, the [common
law] rule owes its survival to the difficulties of setting any wor:cable standards of unselfish service to
fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people might
fail to rescue , . . ." 17 Cal. 3d at 435 n.5, 551 P.2d at 343 i t.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.5.
327
	 Appendix infra. See also Weinrib, supra note 66, at 262.
325 Id.
329 Id.
33° See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
'3 ' Id.
33 ' In determining the duty issue this way, courts will eliminate the causation problem. See Note,
The Bad Samaritan, supra note 33, at 64I.
333 See Appendix infra. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (Equity 1973), supra note 165.
334 See Appendix infra. Civil liability is also incurred in France for failure to rescue. See supra
notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
333 See Comment, Endangered Act, supra note 167, at 14 i. Professor Franklin states that civil
liability "is no less appropriate here than in cases of negligence or violation of other statutory duties."
See Franklin, supra note 151, at 55.
See Appendix infra. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,1 519 (b) (Equity 1973). See also cupra notes
165. 174-76 and accompanying text, The Vermont rescue statute exempts the rescuer from liability
for any damages he causes while rendering aid. Id. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (2) (West 1983
Supp.). See also supra notes 177, 181 and accompanying text
337
	 supra notes 151-57.
338 See Appendix infra.
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incurs as a result of the rescue a39 Possible sources of indemnification would include the
person who caused the dangerous situation, 340 the victim 34 ' and the state. 342 In those cases
where the victim or the negligent tortfeasor lack the sufficient funds to compensate the
rescuer, the state should indemnify the rescuer for any injuries and or expenses he
incurred as a result of the rescue. This indemnification policy would be a logical extension
of the statutes which currently indemnify rescuers for their injuries and expenses. 343 By
exempting the rescuer from civil liability and by compensating him for his injuries and
expenses, legislatures will explicitly recognize the merits of rescue.
CONCLUSION
In the United States no general duty to assist someone in a dangerous situation exists.
Courts have refused to enforce what is arguably a moral duty to assist someone in peril.
Nevertheless, a trend in both state legislatures and state courts toward imposing upon a
bystander a general duty to assist a person in danger has been gaining momentum. The
cumulative effect of these legislative and judicial developments indicates that this country
is moving closer toward recognizing a legal duty to help someone in a perilous situation.
Given the current trend in the United States toward imposing a duty to assist others in
danger, a rule of law imposing a general duty 10 rescue is desirable and workable. This
note has proposed a Model Act state legislatures could adopt or use in formulating such a
l . •
A law imposing a general duty to rescue would reflect the moral obligation of
common decency and humanity to come to the aid of another human being who is in
danger. Such a law would reflect that shared morality of our community 344 that .
members of our society have a moral responsibility to help one another in times of
emergency. 345 As one commentator so aptly points out: "It should not be forgotten that a
system of law which lags too for behind the universally received conceptions of abstract
justice, in the end must lose the sympathy, the confidence, perhaps even the respect of the
community. "346
TERESITA RODRIGUEZ
333 See Appendix infra. See also CAL. Gov't.. CODE § 13970 (West 1980), supra note 161.
3" See Appendix infra. See also Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437
(1927). See also supra note 64.
341 See Appendix infra. See also Britt v. Mangum, 261 N.C. 250, 255.56, 134 S.E.2d 235, 239
(1964). See also supra note 64.
343 See Appendix infra. See also Cm.. Gov'r. CODE § 13970 (West 1980), supra note 161.
341 Id. See also supra notes 158-63.
3" See Honore, supra note 316, at 231.
3" One American judge has stated:
Mt is undoubtedly the moral duty of every person to extend to others assistance when
in danger; to throw, for instance, a plank or rope to the drowning man, or make other
efforts for his rescue, and if such efforts should be omitted by anyone when they could
be made without imperilling his own life, he would, by his conduct, draw upon himself
the just censure and reproach of good men . .
U.S. v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Gas. 800, 801 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1864)(No. 15,540).
348 Bohlen pl. 2, supra note 1, at 337.
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APPENDIX
The Model Act provides the following:
(a) Any person at the scene of an emergency, who knows or has reason to
know that another person is exposed to grave physical harm, has a duty to
provide reasonable assistance. Such assistance is required only where no
serious risk is involved for the rescuer. The standard required in recog-
nizing the gravity of the danger involved an I in assessing the form of
assistance required should be that of the r, :asonably prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances.
(b) Reasonable assistance may include notifying t he appropriate authorities
of the dangerous situation or obtaining assis ance from the proper au-
thorities. At times, personal assistance will be I equired if no serious risk is
invoked for the rescuer or any other third 1 arty.
(c) Where several witnesses are present at the set ne of an accident or other
dangerous situation, each witness is legally bound to provide assistance in
a reasonable manner.
(i) If none of the witnesses assists the injured party, each witness is liable,
but only for the amount of injury directly resulting from his failure to
assist.
(ii) The injured party has the right to only one recovery from all the
witnesses, who are entitled to contributic n among themselves.
(d) Any person willfully violating this Act shall be fined not more than
$500.00.
(i) Any person willfully violating this Act mast compensate the injured
party for damages arising from his failu 'e to help.
(e) A person who provides reasonable assistance in accordance with this Act
shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross negli-
gence.
(f) A person who provides reasonable assistance in accordance with this Act is
entitled to be compensated for any injuries c r property damage he sus-
tained as a result of his rescue efforts.
(i) The rescuer is entitled to reasonable cor ipensation from either the
victim or from the person who origins lly created the dangerous
situation prompting the rescue.
(ii) In those situations where either the victi n or the person who origi-
nally created the dangerous situation prompting the rescue lacks the
sufficient funds to provide compensation, the state shall compensate
the rescuer for his injuries and damage:,
